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Arraignment In Federal Criminal
Procedure
Lester B. Orfield*
Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, entitled
"Arraignment," provides as follows:
"Arraignment shall be conducted in open court and shall con-
sist of reading the indictment or information to the defendant or
stating to him the substance of the charge and calling on him to
plead thereto. He shall be given a copy of the indictment or
information before he is called upon to plead."
I. HISTORY OF DRAFTING RULE 10.
The first draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
dated September 8, 1941, contained no separate rule on arraign-
ment. The second draft, dated January 12, 1942, contained an
elaborate and lengthy Rule 50 entitled "Arraignment: Appear-
ance and Plea by Counsel." A corporation could appear by coun-
sel. As to all other defendants in cases not punishable by death
the defendant if the court permitted could appear by counsel on
arraignment to plead not guilty or to move to dismiss the accusa-
tion. But the defendant must have given bail or other security
to appear for trial and filed a written appointment of his at-
torney. Rule 40 entitled "Counsel for Defendant" made provi-
sion for the court's informing the defendant at arraignment of
his right to counsel and for assignment of counsel. Rule 9 on
presence of defendant made it possible for the court to excuse
defendant's presence at arraignment where the process issued
was a summons.
Rule 51(a) of the third draft, dated March 4, 1942, much
more nearly approached the final form of the rule. The first
sentence provided that when "a written accusation has been filed
against a person he shall be arraigned in open court by having
the charge stated or read to him and by being called upon to
plead thereto." The second sentence provided that the "defend-
ant shall receive a copy of the written accusation if he makes a
request for it prior to arraignment or if the court directs that a
copy or copies be provided for him." The Reporter indicated that
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the transcript was inconclusive as to whether it was the Com-
mittee's intention that the defendant must request the copy or
whether it must be offered him without request. The provisions
on presence of defendant at arraignment were transferred over
to Rule 50 on presence of defendant. In the fourth draft, dated
May 18, 1942, there was a separate rule on arraignment, Rule
S14 -The rule now used the language "indictment or information"
instead of "written accusation." The first sentence now read:
"A defendant is arraigned by having the indictment or informa-
tion stated or read to him in open court and by having him
called: upon to plead thereto." A second sentence provided that
the defendant might waive the statement or reading. The third
sentence provided: "A copy or copies of the indictment or infor-
mation shall be delivered to him upon his request or upon order
of the court." Rule 13 on "Right to Counsel" stated that the de-
fendant was entitled to counsel "at every stage of the proceed-
ing," and for appointment at arraignment before pleading. Rule
12 on "Presence of Defendant" stated that the "defendant has
the'right to be present at the arraignment." The court with the
defendant's consent could permit absence of the defendant at
arraignment in cases punishable by fine or by imprisonment for
not more than one year or both.
* The fifth draft, dated June 1942, was again numbered 14. It
omitted the sentence providing for waiver of stating or reading
the indictment or information. It omitted the provision for de-
livery of a copy upon order of the court; delivery was only to be
on request of the defendant. The Committee note indicated that
the rule stated the present law on arraignment. It also referred
to the statute calling for delivery of a copy of the indictment in
treason and capital cases; and to the statute providing for deliv-
ery on defendant's request in other cases. Rule 13 on "Right to
Counsel" no longer made specific reference to arraignment.
A draft, known as Preliminary Draft, dated May 1942, very
close in resemblance to the fifth draft, was submitted to the Su-
preme Court for comment. The Supreme Court asked "by whom
is the indictment or information to be 'stated'"? The court also
asked: "Should there be a lapse of time between reading the in-
dictment and plea, unless defendant announces he is ready to
proceed, or he has received a copy of the indictment in advance
of the trial? Should the rule not state that the court shall inform
the defendant that he is entitled to a copy of the indictment, and
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should the rule not state that the reading of the indictment- may
be waived by the defendant?"
The sixth draft, dated Winter 1942-1943, made several
changes. It now received its present number 10. The first sen-
tence provided: "A defendant is arraigned by reading to him
the indictment or information or by stating to him the substance
thereof and by calling on him to plead thereto." The second sen,
tence provided: "The arraignment is conducted in open court."'
The third sentence provided: "A copy of the indictment ortinfor-.
mation shall be delivered to him at any time upon request made.
to the clerk." The language "at any time" and "made to the.
clerk" in the third sentence was new. The Reporter stated in a.
memorandum to the Committee that these changes were madez:
because of the suggestion of the Supreme Court indicating the
desirability of more specific provision for the defendant's getting
a copy of the indictment in ample time to give him adequate op-
portunity to make use of it in preparation for arraignment and
for trial. No request to the court for a copy is necessary'. The
Advisory Committee had decided before the suggestion of the
Supreme Court that the more detailed provisions for arraign-
ment suggested by the court should continue to be left in the
discretion of the trial judge. Information has not come to the
Committee that the present procedure on these points is in need
of improvement.
The late Professor George H. Dession submitted an alterna-
tive Rule 10 under which there was to be a delivery to the de-
fendant upon his request made at any time of the "names and
addresses of all the witnesses or deponents on whose evidence
the indictment or information was based." A failure to furnish
such names and addresses shall not affect the validity of the
indictment or information but the court shall, upon application
of the defendant, direct that such names and addresses be fur-
nished. Upon his request "the defendant shall be allowed a rea-
sonable time, not less than one day, to plead to the indictment or
information." Professor Dession pointed out that there is no
federal statute providing for, nor does present practice sanction,
the revelation of the names of witnesses or deponents to the de-
fendant.1 Most states have enacted a requirement that the. de-
*Professor of Law, Indiana University; Member, United States Supreme Court
Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure.
1. Moore v. Aderhold, 108 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1939) ; Knight v. Hudspeth,
112 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 681 (1940) ; United States
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fendant be furnished with such names. 2 At least 20 states pro-
vide that the defendant be allowed a specified or reasonable time
to answer the indictment or information if he requires it.8 The
Advisory Committee did not adopt the alternative proposal of
Professor Dession.
*The First Preliminary Draft (seventh committee draft)
dated May 1943 made a number of changes. Rule 11 entitled
"Arraignment" provided: "Arraignment shall be conducted in
open court and shall consist of reading the indictment or infor-
mation to the defendant or, if he consents, of stating to him the
substance of the charge, and calling on him to plead thereto. He
shall be advised that he is entitled to a copy of the indictment
or information and if he requests it a copy shall be given to him
before he is called upon to plead."
The following comments were made to the Advisory Commit-
tee on the Rule as it appeared in the First Preliminary Draft.
W. E. Baker, District Judge for the Northern District of Vir-
ginia, would have the rule provide specifically that the United
States Attorney supply the copy of the indictment or informa-
tion.4 There would be delay if the copy was to be furnished by
any other person such as the clerk. Edwin R. Holmes of the
Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit would omit the provision
that the defendant be advised of his right to a copy. Seth R.
Thomas, of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit would
omit the language requiring consent of the defendant to omission
of the reading since the defendant is entitled to a copy of the
indictment or information. A. Lee Wyman, District Judge for
the District of South Dakota, would not allow omission of the
reading of the indictment or information as the record may not
show that the defendant was advised of the specific charge
against him.6 This defect more than offsets the time saved. In
his district he permitted waiver of reading only in misdemeanor
cases where the defendant was represented by counsel. George
Philip of the Committee for the District of South Dakota took
the same view.6 Joseph T. Votava, United States Attorney for
v. Central Supply Ass'n, 34 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1940) ; Orfield, The Federal
Grand Jury, 22 F.RD. 343, 410, 452 (1958-1959).
2. A.L.I. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 207 and Annots. 607-10 (1931).
3. See id. at § 207 and Annots. 637-38.
4. 2 COMMENTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS RECEIVED CONCERNING
THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 85 (1943).
5. Id. at 86.
6. Id. at 87.
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the District of Nebraska, would require a reading unless the de-
fendant waived. Neil Burkinshaw of Washington, D. C., would
not require consent of the defendant to omission of reading as
reading would be extremely burdensome.7 In the District of Co-
lumbia reading is required only in capital cases. In other eases
the clerk simply advises the defendant that he is charged with
housebreaking, forgery, etc., and asks him how he wishes to
plead. Furthermore reading is pointless, as the defendant is en-
titled to a copy. Robert M. Hitchcock of Dankirk, New York,
took the same position. Frequently stating the substance of an
indictment is far more understandable to a defendant than
reading the entire indictment to him. Bert A. Riley of the Bar
Committee for the Southern District of Florida would add the
following provision: "Neither a failure to arraign nor an irregu-
larity in the arraignment shall affect the validity of any pro-
ceedings in the cause if the defendant pleads to the indictment
or information, or proceeds to trial without objecting to such
failure or irregularity." Judge Robert N. Wilkin of the Northern
District of Ohio would have a copy of the accusation furnished
the defendant without request by him in all cases.8 This would
simplify and make the procedure more certain. It is easier and
quicker to serve a copy than to advise the defendant that he is
entitled to a copy. Thomas J. Morrissey, United States Attorney
for the District of Colorado, thought that arraignment in juve-
nile cases should be in chambers.9 After the words "in open
court" he would add "or in Chambers at the discretion of the
court." M. Neil Andrews, United States Attorney for the North-
ern District of Georgia, would require the defendant to plead in
writing, thus avoiding numerous habeas corpus actions in which
the applicant claims he did not intend to plead guilty. Joseph F.
Deeb, United States Attorney for the Western District of Michi-
gan, objected that the rule laid down a mandatory form of ar-
raignment.'0 In his district the practice for many years was that
the court simply inquired of the defendant whether he under-
stood the charges against him. If the court is not satisfied that
the defendant understands, the court either directs the United
States Attorney to make further explanation or the court itself
explains the charge. In every case the defendant or his attorney
7. Id. at 88.
8. 2 id. at 382.
9. 2 id. at 383. Judge Lewis B. Schwellenbach of the Eastern District of
Washington took the same view. 2 id. at 385.
10. 2 id. at 385.
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has had a conference prior to arraignment with the United
States Attorney and has had tendered him a copy of the indict-
ment or information. The Judicial Conference for the Ninth
Circuit adopted a resolution against requiring consent of the de-
fendant to omission of the reading, and another resolution re-
quiring that a copy of the indictment or information be supplied
the defendant before he is called upon to plead. James E. Ruffin
of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice would
amend the rule so as to require that a copy of the indictment, if
requested, be given the defendant a reasonable time before he
is called upon to plead.
The Second Preliminary Draft (eighth Committee draft),
dated February 1944, was similar to the First Preliminary Draft
except that it omitted the language "if he consents" in the first
sentence. Thus the indictment or information could be stated in
substance without obtaining his consent.
The following comments were made to the Advisory Commit-
tee on the Rule as it appeared in the Second Preliminary Draft.
Judge Schoonmaker of the Western District of Pennsylvania
pointed out that in his district there is a printing on the back
of the indictment whereby the defendant waives arraignment
and enters his plea." In practice it is always done that way. At-
torneys do not wait around until a long indictment is read. This
is time consuming. The attorneys know what it is all about.
Judge Bascom Deaver of the Middle District of Georgia, T. Hoyt
Davis, United States Attorney for that district, and the Bar
Committee for that district thought that the rule should be clari-
fied to make certain that arraignment can be waived. The fed-
eral judges in Ohio would amend the rule to provide that a copy
of the indictment be served on the defendant five days before
arraignment and that the defendant should not be arraigned
earlier or before service unless he waives his right to such pro-
vision. Judges Tuttle and Picard of Michigan objected to this
proposal. This would make the rule too detailed; logically it
would also require a return of service. Thus delay would be
promoted. A special committee of the Oregon State Bar and
Judge A. Lee Wyman of the District of South Dakota thought a
reading of the indictment should be required unless the defend-
ant consented to omission of reading.1 2 S. H. Sibley of the Court
11. 3 id. at 39.
1.2. 3 id. at 40.
[Vol. XX
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit thought that the second sentence
on copy of the indictment unnecessary. 18 In his circuit copies
are always supplied on request. Advising of the right at arraign-
ment might postpone many trivial cases because copies could not
be at once furnished. Some of the division points in the districts
are hundreds of miles apart, and the judges present only twice
a year. There have been no complaints under the existing sys-
tem. The Committee of the State Bar of California would join
the rule in arraignment with the rule on appointment of coun-
sel. 14 Furthermore a copy of the accusation should be delivered
before entry of plea; and the defendant should be advised at the
time of delivery that he is entitled to a reasonable continuance
before he enters his plea. The Special Committee of the Los An-
geles Bar Association would substitute for the second sentence
the following: "He shall be advised by the court of his constitu-
tional rights. He shall be furnished a copy of the indictment or
information before he is called upon to plead and shall be given,
if he requests it, a reasonable time, but not less than 48 hours,
within which to plead." The Committee would also add a new
paragraph providing: "If the defendant enters a plea of not
guilty, he shall be entitled to receive, at least 10 days before trial,
a copy of the stenographic transcript of all testimony taken be-
fore the grand jury. He shall also be entitled to an inspection
of all exhibits there produced."
The Report of the Advisory Committee (ninth committee
draft), dated June 1944, was identical with the Second Prelimi-
nary Draft. The Supreme Court made no changes in the first
sentence. But it rejected the second sentence which required a
request for a copy of the indictment or information. Instead the
Supreme Court language provided simply: "He shall be given
a copy of the indictment or information before he is called upon
to plead." This was a wise change. As the late Professor Des-
sion stated: "It is refreshing to know that the picayune expense
of making an extra carbon copy need no longer deter us from
giving defendants the information they need."'15
13. 4 id. at 26.
14.. 4 id. at. 27.
15. Dession, The New Federal Rule8 of Criminal Procedure: II, 56 YALE
L.,T. 197, 210 (1947).
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II. FEDERAL PROCEDURE PRIOR TO RULE 10
Definition
The term "arraignment" appears in the cases as early as
1806.16 The federal statutes did not define the term.17 In 1896
the Supreme Court cited the definitions of Coke, Hale, Black-
stone, and Chitty.' s A district court has stated: "The arraign-
ment of the person accused of a public offense is nothing more or
less than calling him to the bar of the court, and demanding of
him, after explanation of the indictment, whether he pleads
guilty or not guilty."'19 In point of time the arraignment pre-
cedes the plea. The Supreme Court has stated: "There is no
explicit provision in the laws of the United States describing
what shall constitute an arraignment. But so far as it is ex-
pressed it has a definite meaning .... It will be observed that
the word 'arraignment' is used as comprehensively descriptive
of what shall precede the plea."0 The court below had offered
the following definition: "Strictly speaking, the defendant is
arraigned by being called to the bar of the court to answer the
accusation contained in the indictment, the arraignment consist-
ing of three parts: (1) Calling the defendant by name and com-
manding him to hold up his hand, that his identification may be
certain, (2) reading to him the indictment, and (3) taking his
plea." 21
What Law Governs
Arraignment in federal criminal cases is not governed by
state law.22 Circuit Judge Brewer so concluded, stating that "we
16. United States v. Smith, 27 Fed. Cas. 1186, Case No. 16,341a (C.C.D.
N.Y. 1806).
17. The various federal statutes of 1790, 1825, and 1835 are cited in Crain v.
United States, 162 U.S. 625, 644 (1896).
18. Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1896).
19. United States v. McKnight, 112 Fed. 982, 983 (W.D. Ky. 1902). In
perhaps the earliest case to attempt to define arraignment Circuit Justice Story
stated after referring to the views of Blackstone and Hale: "When the prisoner
is brought into court to answer the indictment, he is said to be brought in to be
arraigned therein; for 'to arraign is nothing else but to call the person to the bar
of the court, to answer the matter charged upon him by the indictment'." United
States v. Gibert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287, 1304, Case No. 15,205 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834).
20. Johnson v. United States, 225 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1912).
21. Johnson v. United States, 38 App. D.C. 347, 349 (1912). See also Note, 3
DE PAUL L. REv. 105 (1953).
22. Circuit Justice Story held that even though by state law the final step in
arraignment might be the question as to how the defendant will be tried, such a
question was not necessary in federal criminal cases under the Constitution and
laws of the United States. United States v. Gibert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287, 1305, Case
No. 15,204 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834).
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have the federal statutes, and wherever there is a federal statute
it controls irrespective of any state law or practice." A federal
statute provided that no judgment should "be affected by reason
of any defect or imperfection in matter of form only, which
shall not tend to the prejudice of the defendant." 24 The defend-
ant could not insist on a new trial for error in arraignment as
the federal statutes make the granting of new trials in civil cases
a matter of discretion; hence the state law on new trials would
not be applied.
Function and Purpose
Circuit Judge Brewer, later a member of the Supreme Court,
stated the purposes of arraignment as follows: "It is laid down
in the old books that three objects are to be subserved: (1) The
identification of the defendant; (2) giving him information of
the particular offense charged against him for which he is to
be tried; and (3) to receive from him the plea which he makes
to that charge. '25
The purpose of an arraignment is to obtain from the defend-
ant his answer, in other words, his plea - to the indictment.26
It would seem to follow that if the defendant voluntarily makes
his plea without a formal demand upon him to know what it is,
and the court accepts the plea as sufficient to form the issue
and records the plea, the whole object of the arraignment has
been accomplished. This is true for misdemeanor cases; the
entering of a plea of not guilty necessarily presupposes an ar-
raignment in fact or a waiver of it. Another court has stated:
"The object of an arraignment is the identification of the ac-
cused and the framing of an issue upon which he may be tried. '27
The Supreme Court has stated that the object of arraignment is
"to inform the accused of the charge against him and obtain an
answer from him." 2 A court of appeal has said: "Arraignment,
while not a perfunctory proceeding, is in actual practice as con-
ducted in the District Court, primarily to facilitate the fixing of
the docket.'2
9
23. United States v. Molloy, 31 Fed. 19, 22 (E.D. Mo. 1887). Hence Mis-
souri law would not be applied in the federal court sitting in Missouri.
24. This statute was also relied on by District Judge Thayer in the same ease.
Id. at 23-24.
25. Id. at 22. See Notes, 3 DE PAUL L. REV. 105, 107 (1953) ; 31 TULANIE L.
REV. 682 (1957).
26. United States v. McKnight, 112 Fed. 982, 983 (W.D. Ky. 1902).
27. Johnson v. United States, 38 App. D.C. 347, 349 (1912).
28. Garland v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642, 644 (1914).
29. MeJordan v. Huff, 133 F.2d 408, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
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Obsolete Steps in Arraignment
At common law the first step in arraignment consisted of
calling the defendant to the bar by his name, and commanding
him to hold up his hand. But it was held as early as 1828 that
the defendant need not hold up his hand, if he admits himself to
be the person indicted3 0 But he may be compelled to go into the
priminal box or dock in felony cases."'
When upon arraignment the defendant pleads not guilty, it
is not necessary that the clerk inquire how the defendant be
tried.32 Trial by jury is the only mode of trial. Trial by battle
has long been abolished; hence there is no need for the question. 8
Present Insanity
A defendant presently insane cannot plead at his arraign-
men't.3 4 The common law applies, hence the mode of deciding
this issue lies within the discretion of the court. He should not
be arraigned when presently insane. Defendant's counsel should
object before arraignment; but a failure to object before ar-
raignment does not bar objection after arraignment in bar of
trial. Defendant may object orally, or may move for a continu-
ance.
Postponement
Ifwa defendant knows of no ground for bias or other chal-
lenges to the grand jury when brought up for arraignment, but
wishes to reserve the privilege of examining further, he must
apply to the court to postpone the arraignment until he has had
adequate opportunity to press his inquiries.3 5 A statute required
30. United States v. Pittman, 27 Fed. Cas. 543, Case No. 16,053 (C.C.D.C.
1828). But: compare Johnson v. United States, 38 App. D.C. 347, 349 (1912).
31., United States v. Pittman, 27 Fed. Cas. 543, Case No. 16,053 (C.C.D.C.
1828) ; United States v. Pettis, 27 Fed. Cas. 521, Case No. 16,038 (C.C.D.C.
1831).
32. United States v. Gibert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287, 1303-06, Case No. 15,204
(C.C.D. Mass. 1834). Opinion was by Circuit Justice Story.
33. But in view of the modern provision for waiver of jury trial it has been
suggested that the question be restored. PERKINS, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PaOCEDURE 911 (1959). The early cases did not admit the possibility of waiver.
United States v. Gibert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287, 1306, Case No. 15,204 (C.C.D. Mass.
1834).
34. Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937, 940 (6th Cir. 1899) ; United States
v. Harriman, 4 F. Supp. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1933); United States v. Boylen, 41 F.
Supp. 724 (D. Ore. 1941) ; Dession, The Mentally Ill Offender in Federal Criminal
Law and Administration, 53 YALE L.J. 684, 687 (1944). See ORFIELD, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE FROM ARREST To APPEAL 280 (1947).
35. United States ex rel. McCann v. Thompson, 144 F.2d 604, 608, 156 A.L.R.
240 (2d Cir. 1944) ;-Medley v. United States, 81 U.S. App. D.C. 85, 155 F.2d
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the defendant before arraignment or during the next ten days
to plead in abatement or to move to quash the indictment because
of irregularity in drawing or impaneling the grand jury, or dis-
qualification of a grand juror.3 6
Presence of Judge
An arraignment by the United States Attorney in the absence
of the judge would be void.37 By way of analogy it is arguable
that counsel for defendant must be present unless his presence
is intelligently waived.
Presence of Defendant
It may perhaps be implied from an early decision that there
are some cases in which a defendant need not be present at his
arraignment. One indicted for a misdemeanor, assault and bat-
tery of a seaman, may plead and defend by his attorney, without
his own physical presence when no imprisonment must be inflict-
ed and will not be inflicted, when the United States Attorney
consents or unreasonably withholds his consent, when there is
sufficient cause shown by affidavit to account for the absence
of the defendant, and when the defendant has executed a special
power of attorney permitting such defense.38
In a subsequent case the Supreme Court stated broadly: "A
leading principle that pervades the entire law of criminal pro-
cedure is that, after indictment found, nothing shall be done in
the absence of the prisoner. While this rule has, at times and
in the cases of misdemeanors, been somewhat relaxed, yet in fel-
onies, it is not in the power of the prisoner, either by himself
or his counsel, to waive the right to be personally present during
the trial. '39 The record must show presence. However, the case
857, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, :128 U.S. 873 (1946). See Orfield, The
Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 373-74 (1958).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 556a (1958).
37. Saylor v. Sanford, 99 F.2d 605, 606 (5th Cir. 1938).
38. United States v. Mayo, 26 Fed. Cas. 1230, Case No. 15,754 (C.C.D. Mass.
1853). The opinion was by Circuit Justice Curtis.
In Elick v. Territory of Washington, 1 Wash. T. 138 (1861), it was held that
an attorney for an Indian defendant charged with murder could not plead guilty
for the defendant unless the defendant is shown to be incapacitated. This case is
cited favorably in State v. Walton, 50 Ore. 142, 150, 91 Pac. 490, 493 (1907).
39. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892). As to how the de-
fendant is brought before the court for arraignment Justice Field has stated:
"When the indictment is found, or the information is filed, a warrant is issued
for the arrest of the accused to be brought before the court, unless he is at the
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on its facts involved absence at challenging of the jurors rather
than absence at arraignment.
In a case coming up from the Philippine Islands the Supreme
Court regarded presence of the defendant at his arraignment as
indispensable in a felony case because the Philippine statutes
expressly provided for it. 4o In a state court case the Supreme
Court indicated that presence in misdemeanor cases is not re-
quired by due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 41
Reading of Accusation
The early practice was to read the indictment.42 Where a de-
fendant demurs to an indictment and the demurrer is heard and
overruled, and he is then required to plead to it without having
it read to him, the reading not having been demanded by him, he
cannot succeed on a motion in arrest of judgment.43 In this case
the indictment was very voluminous, containing several hundred
pages. The defendant had been called by the clerk, by direction
of the court, and had appeared at the bar. The United States
Attorney observed to the court that he supposed reading the in-
dictment unnecessary and the court had replied: "Certainly not;
let him plead." The clerk then asked the defendant: "To this
indictment, do you plead guilty or not guilty?" The defendant
pleaded not guilty and did not then and there object that the
indictment had not been read to him nor its substance stated to
him. The substance of the indictment was stated later to the
jury but it was not read to the jury. The Supreme Court has
pointed out that information of the charge against him may be
given to the accused without reading the indictment.44
The defendant may waive the reading of the indictment. He
did so in one case where the consolidated indictment covered 607
pages of the printed record and four days would have been re-
time in custody, in which case an order for that purpose is made, to the end, in
either case, that he may be arraigned and plead to the indictment or information."
In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 257 (1894).
40. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 454 (1912).
41. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 340 (1915).
42. United States v. Gibert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287, 1304, Case No. 15,204 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1834).
43. United States v. Bickford, 24 Fed. Cas. 1144, Case No. 14,591 (C.C.D. Vt.
1859).
44. Johnson v. United States, 225 U.S. 405, 409 (1912). The lower court
raised the issue whether reading may be waived in a capital case, but found it
unnecessary to decide it. Johnson v. United States, 38 App. D.C. 347, 350 (1912).
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quired to read the indictment.45 Such waiver prevents the de-
fendant from objecting that the whole indictment must be read
at the trial.
Copy of Accusation
In an ordinary criminal case the defendant was not entitled
to a copy of the indictment to be furnished him at the expense
of the government as no statute provided for it. 46 It made no
difference that the defendant applied for a copy. He was not
entitled to a copy under the Sixth Amendment requiring that in
all criminal cases the defendant shall "be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation." But the court could order that a
copy be given the defendant upon his request at the expense of
the government. 47 In many cases the defendant does not desire
a copy, or pleads guilty when the indictment is read to him. In
such cases there is no propriety in forcing a copy on him at gov-
ernment expense. There is a right to a copy in capital cases only
because a statute expressly provides for it. In a capital case the
defendant is entitled to a copy at least two days before the trial
when he seasonably claims such right.48 The error would not be
cured by acquittal of the capital offense and conviction of a
lesser offense charged in the same indictment. The duty to sup-
ply a copy in capital cases is mandatory. 49
Even in a capital case the defendant may waive his right to
a copy of the indictment by failure to object until the end of the
trial. 50 The defendant ought to object before the jury is impan-
eled, or at least when the first witness is called for examination.
Even if objection is timely possibly there is no reversible error
when two substantially similar indictments are involved and one
of them is served on the defendant; this would seem to be true
where the only differences consist in the number and date on the
indictments.
The statute eventually provided in 1927 as to ordinary crim-
inal cases, not involving treason or a capital offense that "the
45. Gardes v. United States, 87 Fed. 172, 178 (5th Cir. 1898), cert. denied,
171 U.S. 689 (1898). In accord see Cornett v. United States, 7 F.2d 531 (8th
Cir. 1925).
46. United States v. Bickford, 24 Fed. Cas. 1144, Case No. 14,591 (C.C.D.
Vt. 1859). In accord see United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169 (1891).
47. United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 173 (1891).
48. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 304 (1892). In case of treason the
copy is to be delivered at least three days before trial.
49. Aldridge v. United States, 47 F.2d 407, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1931), reversed




clerk shall furnish each defendant upon his request, a copy of
any information filed or indictment returned against him, the
fees for said copy and the certificate thereto, at the rate provided
for by law, to be taxed as costs." 51 It was held that a defendant
was not entitled to a continuance on the ground that he had not
been furnished a copy of the indictment until four days prior to
the date set for trial where the defendant had not requested the
clerk to furnish him a copy.5 2 The court pointed out that even in
a capital case the defendant had a right to a copy of the indict-
ment only two days before trial. Moreover the defendant in this
case did have a copy from which had been deleted the names of
the co-conspirators and the other defendants. These names could
be filled in by examining the original indictment which was in
the hands of the defendant four days before trial.
In an ordinary criminal case a failure to serve the defendant
with a copy of the indictment does not go the jurisdiction of
the sentencing court, hence habeas corpus does not lie. 53 This is
particularly the case when there is no allegation of a request for
a copy and a refusal thereof.
Record and Waiver: Due Process
An early decision laid down a liberal rule allowing waiver of
arraignment. Where a defendant was not arraigned and made
no plea before the trial, but was identified, knew exactly the of-
fense charged, denied the charge, went to trial on the denial, and
went on the witness stand and there denied the offense and was
convicted, he was not entitled to a new trial for failure of the
record to show arraignment and plea as there was no prejudicial
error under the statute eliminating defects of form.54 The state
51. 18 U.S.C. § 562a (1940).
52. Harper v. United States, 143 F.2d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1944). In Cuckovich
v. United States, 170 F.2d 89, 90 (6th Cir. 1948), the court failed to refer to this
statute, stating broadly that there was no requirement that a defendant be fur-
nished a copy.
53. Taylor v. Hudspeth, 113 F.2d 825, 826 (10th Cir. 1940). Treason or a
capital offense was not involved.
54. United States v. Molloy, 31 Fed. 19, 21 (E.D. Mo. 1887). But waiver of
arraignment in felony cases was refused in United States v. Pittman, 27 Fed. Cas.
543, Case No. 16,053 (C.C.D.C. 1828) ; United States v. Pettis, 27 Fed. Cas. 521,
Case No. 16,038 (C.C.D.C. 1831.) ; Elick v. Washington Territory, I Wash. T. 136
(1861).
The defendant may not move in arrest because he was arraigned under a cer-
tified copy of the indictment on remission of the case from the district court to




rule of procedure as to arraignments did not apply to federal
arraignments.
In a decision of the Supreme Court in 1896, with Justices
Peckham, Brewer, and White dissenting, it was held that with
respect to infamous crimes there must be an arraignment and
plea; and that furthermore the record must show that these oc-
curred. 55 The record would not show an arraignment where it
contained merely an order made at the beginning of the trial and
as soon as the defendant appeared, reciting that the jury was
selected, impaneled and sworn "to try the issue joined." Nor
was it shown by a statement in the bill of exceptions that the
jury were "sworn and charged to try the issues joined."
The defect of no formal arraignment was not cured by the
statute providing that a trial should not be affected because of
any defect or imperfection in matter of form not prejudicing the
defendant. In capital and other infamous crimes an arraignment
has always been regarded as a matter of substance. The court
cited the views of Coke, Hale, Blackstone, and Chitty. It cited
many state court decisions, but no federal court decisions. It
cited Bishop and Wharton. Without referring to arraignment
the court concluded that it is the prevailing rule that a plea to
the indictment is necessary at least in cases of felony. The court
referred to the federal statute on arraignment and plea as neces-
sitating the making of a plea. The record must show affirma-
tively that it was demanded of the defendant to plead, or that he
did so plead. The Constitution does not expressly provide for ar-
raignment and plea. But due process of law requires that the
defendant plead, or be ordered to plead, or, in a proper case, that
a plea of not guilty be filed for him, before his trial can proceed;
and the record must show this distinctly.
The dissenting judges thought that it was enough that in
fact the defendant had been arraigned and pleaded. Error in the
record is not presumed, but must be shown. The record implied-
55. Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625, 636 (1896). It was said in United
States v. Aurandt, 15 N.M. 292, 107 Pac. 1064 (1910), that this case overruled
United States v. Molloy, 31 Fed. 19 (E.D. Mo. 1889). Oddly none of the opinions
in the Grain case, not even the dissenting opinion, referred to the Molloy case.
The Grain case was thought to represent the view of most American courts
at the time. See Notes, 21 HAv. L. REV. 217 (1908) ; 6 MIcH. L. REv. 82 (1907).
noting State v. Walton, 50 Ore. 142, 91 Pac. 490 (1907), which accepted the
Grain case as correct for state court procedure. The Crain case was also followed
in Dansby v. United States, 2 Ind. T. 456, 51 S.W. 1083 (1899) ; Beck v. United
States, 145 Fed. 625 (2d Cir. 1906).
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ly showed arraignment and plea. While the defendant made a
motion in arrest of judgment, his motion did not raise the issue
of want of arraignment. The defendant did not raise the issue
when he vas asked why sentence should not be pronounced on
the verdict. Defendant's assignment of errors in connection with
his writ of error did not raise it; and it was raised only in his
brief before the Supreme Court. Even if there had been no
arraignment in fact, the defendant went to trial without objec-
tion on his part; thus there was a waiver of arraignment. De-
fendant had not in fact been harmed by the procedure used. If
the defendant wishes an arraignment, he should not ask for it
for the first time on appellate review; he should ask for it before
the trial commences. However, the dissenters do not base their
dissent on the waiver, but rather on the fact that in their opinion
the record impliedly did show that arraignment and plea had
occurred. The statute that a trial should not be affected by im-
perfections of form should apply to this case.
Following this decision a court of appeals held that where
the record was silent as to both arraignment and plea, arraign-
ment could be waived, but not plea. 56 In capital or other in-
famous crimes arraignment and plea were matters of substance
to be shown by the record. A plea was necessary in both felony
and misdemeanor cases, as without a plea there is no issue to be
submitted to the jury.
Also following this decision of the Supreme Court a district
court intimated that no formal arraignment should be required
in misdemeanor cases.57 The holding was not a strong one, as
the case involved a trial after a trial in which there had been an
arraignment.
In a second case the Supreme Court adhered to its earlier de-
cision and held that in capital and otherwise infamous crimes
"both the arraignment and plea are a matter of substance, and
must be affirmatively shown by the record. '58 With respect to
56. Shelp v. United States, 81 Fed. 694, 701 (9th Cir. 1897). In Beck v.
United States, 145 Fed. 625 (2d Cir. 1906) it was held that where a defendant
was tried without having interposed a plea to any of the counts of the indict-
ment except one, to which he pleaded not guilty, the issue made by such plea is
the only one which can be tried.
57. United States v. McKnight, 112 Fed. 982, 983 (W.D. Ky. 1902). See
Note, 3 DE PAUL L. REv. 105, 109 (1953).




the constitutional provision in the Sixth Amendment that the
accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the action
against him the court pointed out that information of the charge
may be given without reading the indictment. The record may
allege arraignment without also alleging reading.
Finally in 1914 the Supreme Court in a state court case re-
versed its former holding as to the necessity of arraignment. 59
The want of a formal arraignment to a second information of
the same offense does not deprive the defendant of any substan-
tial right, and where the course of the trial, otherwise fair, was
not in any manner affected by his procedure, there is no denial
of due process of law. The defendant had been arraigned as to
the first information. He had not taken any specific objection
before trial to the want of a formal arraignment, but objected
during the trial itself to the introduction of any evidence. In
effect the defendant had waived any right to an arraignment on
the second information. The court pointed out that the historical
reasons for a stricter rule had disappeared, as the defendant now
has the right to counsel and to testify, and penalties are no
longer severe.
Following this decision of the Supreme Court a number of
lower court decisions were rendered finding a binding waiver.6 0
In one case an indictment was presented and four days later it
was ordered that the defendant appear for arraignment five
days after the order. A demurrer was filed and argued and over-
ruled. The United States Attorney and counsel for the defend-
ant then agreed on a trial date and that the defendant should
plead on the trial date so as to save a trip. At the opening of the
trial the indictment was read to the jury, and the clerk stated
that the defendant had entered a plea of not guilty. The defend-
ant proceeded to trial without objection that there had been no
arraignment or plea. At the end of the trial the defendant moved
in arrest of judgment and his motion was overruled. On appeal
no error was found.61 The court of appeals referred to the stat-
59. Garland v. State of Washington, 232 U.S. 642, 645 (1914). The Note, 27
HARv. L. REV. 760 (1914), points out that the weight of authority in the state
courts was opposed because without an arraignment and plea there is no issue to
try, or because no statute provides for waiver. But the decision was regarded
as sound in principle. Today the weight of authority permits waiver. Note, 3
DE PAUL L. REV. 105, 109 (1953). See also Note, 27 MicH. L. REv. 703 (1929).
60. In one case it was pointed out that the Supreme Court ruling applied to
federal cases as well as state, and that it applied even though the issue was raised
in the trial court. Cornett v. United States, 7 F.2d 531, 532 (8th Cir. 1925).
61. Shidler v. United States, 257 Fed. 620, 624 (9th Cir. 1919). The court
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ute on standing mute and to the last Supreme Court decision up-
holding waiver. It is too late to object to want of arraignment
after judgment.6 2 It cannot first be raised on a motion for new
trial.6
3
In one case nine defendants were involved, six of whom had
been previously tried for what they claimed to be the same of-
fense. In the present proceeding all nine were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. Later they were given leave to withdraw
their pleas and to demur to the indictment. The demurrers were
overruled and the trial commenced. Early in the trial counsel
called the court's attention to the fact that there were no pleas
as the pleas had been withdrawn and asked permission to plead.
Counsel for the other three defendants concurred in asking per-
mission to plead. The trial court did not distinguish the two sets
of defendants, and held as to all that their failure to plead after
demurrer was a waiver of their right to plead. On appeal it was
held that there be a reversal as to the set of six defendants. 64
They had not by inaction waived their right to plead; but had
offered to plead both the general issue (not guilty) and a special
plea in lieu of the action (double jeopardy). They had repeatedly
objected during the trial. They were deprived of their oppor-
tunity to defend under a proposed plea of double jeopardy. The
other three defendants objected too late. They objected only
when objection for the other six defendants was made. They
were not prejudiced as they had not previously been tried and
could not therefore plead double jeopardy.
Where the defendant, after the government had introduced
its evidence and rested, moved for a directed verdict on the
ground that he had not been formally arraigned and was then
told to plead and did plead not guilty, it has been held that a
waiver is conclusively presumed. 65 A failure to arraign until
the close of the government's case is not ground for motion to
dismiss.66
In general, where the defendant proceeds to trial without ob-
also cited State v. Klasner, 19 N.M. 474, 145 Pac. 679, Ann. Cas. 1917D 824
(1914).
62. Rossi v. United States, 278 Fed. 349, 353 (9th Cir. 1922).
63. Williams v. United States, 3 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1925).
64. Rulovitch v. United States, 286 Fed. 315, 320 (3d Cir. 1923), cert. denied,
261 U.S. 622 (1923).
65. Cornett v. United States, 7 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1925).
66. United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 1929).
There had been a demurrer before trial.
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jection for lack of arraignment and failure to plead, there is a
waiver; or at least the formal defect is not prejudicial so as to
warrant reversal on appeal. 67 In general, the federal cases do
not distinguish between waiver of arraignment and waiver of
plea, as do some states.68
Where there is a recital in the order of the trial court of a
plea of not guilty and where there is no express admission of a
failure to arraign by the trial court or by the United States At-
torney, there may be doubt whether the lack of arraignment may
be established by affidavit."9 But even if it could be so estab-
lished, the conviction would stand when the issue is not raised
until after conviction.
Amendment and New Trial
Must the defendant be arraigned again when the grand jury
has amended the indictment after the original arraignment? The
answer under the early cases seems to be in the affirmative.
Where, after mistrial, and before a new trial, amendments are
made to purely formal parts of certain counts of an indictment,
and the defendant is not rearraigned, even if the irregularity is
material, it can affect only the counts so amended, and the error
is cured by arrest of judgment on such counts.70 Moreover the
defendant had filed a plea of former jeopardy in which he ad-
mitted that he had heard the amended indictment read. The
amendment was merely of the caption of the indictment.
Following this case it was held that on a second or third trial
for a misdemeanor when there was no arraignment this was not
erroneous when there had been an arraignment at the first
trial.71 The plea of not guilty entered at the first trial stood until
the defendant showed a desire to change it. The case is not
necessarily a precedent in felony cases as it is not clear that mis-
demeanor cases required an arraignment even at the first trial.
Subsequently the Supreme Court held in a state court case that
the want of a final arraignment on a second information for the
67. King v. United States, 25 F.2d 242, 243 (6th Cir. 1928) United States
v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 1929).
68. Note, 3 DE PAuL L. REV. 105, 109-11 (1953). But see Shelp v. United
States, 81 Fed. 694, 701 (9th Cir. 1897) decided under the earlier law.
69. Williams v. United States, 3 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1925).
70. Gardes v. United States, 87 Fed. 172, 182-83 (5th Cir. 1898), cert. denied,
171 U.S. 689 (1898).
71. United States v. McKnight, 112 Fed. 982, 984 (W.D. Ky. 1902).
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same offense was not a denial of due process and was waived by
failing to object before trial.7 2 Following this decision of the
Supreme Court a court of appeals held in a federal case that
a failure to arraign a defendant again after amendment of
an information was not ground for reversal.7 3 The original in-
formation charged unlawful possession of liquor and the main-
tenance of a nuisance in violation of the National Prohibition
Law. The amendment added an additional count alleging sale.
But the amendment added nothing substantially different and
did not surprise the defendant. At the most the defendant could
have asked for a continuance but failed to do so. However the
court of appeals reversed the conviction for lack of evidence.
Hence the holding is not a strong one.
Right to Counsel
In 1938 the Supreme Court took the position that failure to
comply with the provision in the Sixth Amendment guaranteeing
the right to counsel meant that the district court lost jurisdiction
over the case. 74 Following this decision, a court of appeals with
one judge disagreeing was willing to concede arguendo that an
arraignment was void when a defendant pleading not guilty was
unable to obtain counsel and had not intelligently waived his
right to counsel.7 5 But the court could proceed after the defend-
ant obtained counsel, withdrew his plea of not guilty, and en-
tered a plea of guilty. Habeas corpus would not lie. But Circuit
Judge Sibley was not willing to concede even for the sake of
argument "that a court cannot arraign one not represented by
counsel without an express waiver of counsel." Defendant had
a right to counsel at arraignment only if he provided himself
counsel,re and at common law he did not even have the right to
retain counsel.
Another court of appeals held a short time later that when a
defendant is arraigned and forced to plead to an indictment
72. Garland v. State of Washington, 232 U.S. 642 (1914). Rearraignment
was required in a homicide case after reversal on appeal and a second prosecution
in Corbett v. State, 91 So.2d 509 (Ala. 1959), noted 31 TUL. L. Rav. 682 (1957).
73. Muncy v. United States, 289 Fed. 780, 781 (4th Cir. 1923).
74. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
75. Saylor v. Sanford, 99 F.2d 605, 606 (5th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S.
630 (1939).
76. Until 1938 the right to counsel was generally understood as meaning merely
the right of the defendant to be represented by counsel retained by him. Holtzoff,
The Right of Counsel Under the Sizth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 1, 7(1944).
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without counsel, there is no denial of due process and no right
to habeas corpus where the defendant pleaded not guilty and
was thereafter represented by an attorney on the trial."7 The
defendant is not prejudiced when he pleads not guilty.
Even where without counsel the defendant pleads guilty and
the court appoints counsel immediately after arraignment, and
the defendant elected with advice of counsel to stand on his plea
of guilty, which was subject to change, the constitutional rights
of the defendant were not violated and he was not prejudiced.18
Habeas corpus would not lie. The Supreme Court laid down a
similar rule in a state court case.79 As Professor Fellman points
out: "It has been held that an accused is entitled to the assistance
of a lawyer upon arraignment whether he pleads guilty or not,
but the weight of opinion seems to be otherwise."' 0
But one case has said that the right to counsel accrues as
soon as the grand jury returns an indictment into court.81 And
a leading case has said that there is a right even at the prelimi-
nary examination. 82
At his arraignment the district court should advise the de-
fendant of his right to counsel and of his right, if indigent, to
have counsel appointed for him." This is true even though the
defendant pleads guilty.8 4 "The constitutional guarantee makes
no distinction between the arraignment and other stages of crim-
77. DeMaurez v. Swope, 104 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 1939). See in accord
Thompson v. King, 107 F.2d 307, 308 (8th Cir. 1939) ; Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d
857, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945) ; Wilfong v. Johnston,
156 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir. 1946).
78. MeJordan v. Huff, 133 F.2d 408, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1943), Justice Edgerton
dissenting; Alexander v. United States, 136 F.2d 783, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
79. Can'izio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82, 85 (1946). Justices Murphy and
Rutledge dissented. This case was followed as to a federal criminal defendant in
Hiatt v. Gann, 170 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1948).
80. Fellman, The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Courts, 30 NEB.
L. REv. 599, 588 (1951).
81. Gilmore v. United States, 129 F.2d 199, 203 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 631 (1942).
82. Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 271, 141 A.L.R. 1318 (D.C. Cir.
1942). But the great weight of authority is contrary. Orfield, Proceedings Before
the Commissioner in Federal Criminal Procedure, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 489, 527-
528 (1958). "A federal right to assigned counsel does not exist prior to arraign-
ment in the trial court." MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 177 (1959).
83. Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; McJordan v. Huff,
133 F.2d 408, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Michener v. Johnston, 141 F.2d 171, 174
(9th Cir. 1944); Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment,
20 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 1, 10, 14 (1944). This practice was followed in United States
v. Gibert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287, 1303, Case No. 15,204 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834).
84. Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Holtzoff, The Right
of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 1, 11-13 (1944).
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inal proceedings in respect of the application of the guarantee. '8 5
The "right to the assistance of counsel exists at the time of ar-
raignment as well as at the trial."86 On the whole the federal
cases have been in conflict as to whether the defendant has been
deprived of his constitutional rights if he was unadvised at the
time of arraignment."'
One court has pointed out that the time from arraignment up
to trial is "the most critical period of the proceedings" as "in-
vestigation and preparation" are vitally important and the de-
fendant should have counsel during that period.8 8
Delay Between Arraignment and Trial
What about delay between arraignment and trial? In a case
coming up from the Philippine Islands, Justice Lamar in a dis-
senting opinion objected to a trial commencing eleven months
after arraignment.8 9
III. RULE 10 As INTERPRETED IN THE DECISIONS
Definition
Paraphrasing Rule 10 the Court of Appeals of the Eighth
Circuit has said: "An arraignment consists of calling a defend-
ant to the bar, reading the indictment to him or informing him
of the charge against him, demanding of him whether he is
guilty or not guilty, and entering his plea." 9
Function and Purpose
Arraignment under Rule 10 "is intended to be a safeguard
for due process - a pattern for a fair hearing." 9'
85. Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
86. Robinson v. Johnston, 50 F. Supp. 774, 778 (N.D. Calif. 1943). See also
Michener v. Johnston, 141 F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir. 1944).
87. Note, 42 COL. L. REv. 271, 276 (1942).
88. Price v. Johnston, 144 F.2d 260, 262 (9th Cir. 1944). In this .case the
defendant had counsel.
89. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
90. Caldwell v. United States, 160 F.2d 371, 372 (8th Cir. 1947). The court
cited Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625, 637, 638 (1896) and made no reference
to Rule 10.
The definition in the Caldwell case was repeated in Yodock v. United States,
97 F. Supp. 307, 310 (M.D. Pa. 1951).
Rule 10 does not deal with the defendant's right in capital cases to a list ofjurors and witnesses. On that topic see WHITMAN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
83-87 (1950) ; 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1958).




In some cases a failure to follow Rule 10 may amount to
want of due process.9 2 It is only when a failure to observe Rule
10 amounts to a denial of due process that the court is deprived
of jurisdiction so that habeas corpus will lie. The mere fact that
the plea of guilty was made by the defendant's counsel is not a
denial of due process - when the defendant understood the
charge against him and the nature and consequences of his plea.
Due process does not require a literal compliance with Rule 10.
It is enough that the defendant is clearly informed of and under-
standingly admits the offense charged.9 A motion to vacate
sentence would not lie where defendant's attorney, appointed by
the court on the day of arraignment, stated, while standing be-
side the defendant before the judge, that defendant wished to
enter a plea of guilty, and defendant answered affirmatively the
court's question as to whether the charges, heard by the defend-
ant, were correct. The defendant had then effectively pleaded
guilty in person, as well as by attorney. In this case the court
had called for the F.B.I. agent for his report concerning investi-
gations of the defendant, and the agent stated specifically what
the defendant was charged with. When the agent finished, coun-
sel for defendant stated that he had talked with the defendant
and that he wished to plead guilty. Failure to supply the defend-
ant with a copy of the information is not a denial of due process
when the United States Attorney read and explained to the de-
fendant each count of the information.9 4 There is no denial of
due process because arraignment and impaneling of the jury
takes place on the same day; the defendant has adequate time to
prepare for trial where the indictment was on February 14, ar-
rest and preliminary examination on February 22, arraignment
and impaneling of the jury on March 18, and the trial com-
menced on March 20, and defendant did not move for a continu-
ance when the case was called for trial.9 5 Arraignment before
one judge and trial before another does not violate due process.96
Such procedure is neither unlawful nor unusual and is author-
ized by statute.97
92. Ibid. See Note, 3 DE PAUL L. REV. 105, 106 (1953).
93. Mayes v. United States, 177 F.2d 505, 506 (8th Cir. 1949).
94. Richardson v. United States, 217 F.2d 696, 698 (8th Cir. 1944).
95. Picciurro v. United States, 250 F.2d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 1958).
96. Palmer v. United States, 249 F.2d 8, 9 (10th Cir. 1957). Defendant
moved to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1952).




At about what time in a criminal proceeding in relation to
earlier proceedings will the arraignment occur? In one case the
arrest was on August 24, the indictment was delivered to the de-
fendant on September 18, and arraignment occurred on Septem-
ber 21.98 In another case indictment was on February 14, arrest
and preliminary examination on February 22, and arraignment
and impaneling of the jury on March 18, and trial commenced
on March 20.99 In another case arrest was on August 4, indict-
ment on August 20, and arraignment on August 23.100 The ar-
raignment will have been preceded by a grand jury indictment
or an information filed by the United States Attorney as the ar-
raignment consists of reading the accusation to the defendant or
stating its substance to him.' 10 Usually the defendant will have
been arrested and will have had or waived a preliminary exami-
nation. The preliminary examination will not be necessary when
the first step is the filing of the grand jury indictment or an
information. The arraignment occurs in open court before the
district judge. 10 2 It differs sharply from the preliminary exami-
nation which occurs shortly after arrest before the commission-
er. 08 Historically arraignment is very ancient, while prelimi-
nary examination arose in the nineteenth century. Yet many fed-
eral judges often refer to the preliminary examination or the
bringing before the commissioner as "arraignment.' 10 4
Under Federal Rule 12 (b) (3) a motion to dismiss an indict-
ment or information "shall be made before the plea is entered,
but the court may permit it to be made within a reasonable time
thereafter." However, one case erroneously refers to a statute
requiring objection to be made before or within ten days after
arraignment. 10 5 This statute is now superseded by Rule 12(b)
(3).
98. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 711-12 (1948).
99. Picciurro v. United States, 250 F.2d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 1958).
100. United States v. Von der Heide, 169 F. Supp. 560, 562 (D.D.C. 1959).
See ORFlEuD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 266, n. 1 (1947).
101. Arraignment is the first step after indictment or information. HOUSEL &
WALSER, DEFENDING AND PROSECUTING FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 360, § 257 (2d
ed. 1946). It takes place as soon after indictment or information as the presence
of the defendant can be secured. Id. at 363, § 260.
102. 4 BARRON, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 91, § 1961 (1951).
103. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 275 (1947).
104. Orfield, Proceedings Before the Commissioner in Federal Criminal Pro-
cedure, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 489, 538 (1958).
105. Wright v. United States, 165 F.2d 405, 407 (8th Cir. 1948) ; Orfield, The
Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 423 (1959) ; ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE




The unsupported assertion by the defendant that the indict-
ment was not read in open court and that there was no oppor-
tunity to know its terms furnishes no basis for an order vacating
the sentence when the court records show that the defendant was
arraigned and entered a plea of guilty. 10 6 The records of the dis-
trict court had been attached to and made a part of defendant's
motion to vacate the sentence.
Copy of Accusation
In an appellate decision two years after the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure went into effect the court pointed out that
the defendant is entitled under Rule 10 to a copy of the indict-
ment or information. 0 7 But in a robbery case involving a 25-
year penalty arising before the adoption of Rule 10 there was
no such rule. However it should be noted that in ordinary crim-
inal cases since 1927 by statute the defendant had been entitled
to a copy on request. The defendant waives his right to a copy
when he makes no claim to a copy and does not complain of
its omission until after sentence on a guilty plea. 0 8 Even if he
could claim error on a direct appeal, collateral attack does not
lie under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. One case wrongly asserted that
"there is no obligation on the part of the government to furnish
copies of indictments to defendants in other than capital
cases." 0 9 However the defendant raised the objection on a mo-
tion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255; so he may be regarded as
having waived his right by not asking for a copy seasonably. 110
Failure to supply a copy of the information is not a want of
due process where the defendant's counsel in open court waived
reading of the information; it is unlikely that a waiver would
have occurred if a copy of the information had not been sup-
plied; and the United States Attorney thereafter read and ex-
plained each count in the information."'
In one case the court rather loosely held that showing a copy
106. Caldwell v. United States, 160 F.2d 371, 372 (8th Cir. 1947).
107. Cuckovich v. United States, 170 F.2d 89, 90 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 905 (1949).
108 Ray v. United States, 192 F.2d 658, 659 (5th Cir. 1951). See Note, 3
DE PAUL L. REV. 105, 110 (1953).
109. Yodock v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 307, 311 (M.D. Pa. 1951).
110. Ray v. United States, 192 F.2d 658, 659 (5th Cir. 1951).
111. Richardson v. United States, 217 F.2d 696, 698 (8th Cir. 1954). This
was a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1952).
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of the indictment to counsel for defendant was substantial and
effective compliance with the provision in Rule 10 requiring
that the defendant be given a copy of the indictment before he
pleads.' 12 However, the matter was considered only on the hear-
ing on the defendant's motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
and the motion to vacate itself did not raise the issue. Thus there
was a waiver through delay. Judge Holtzoff has suggested that
the lower federal courts adopt local rules prescribing the man-
ner of delivery to the defendant and the manner of preserving
the record of delivery.13 But he and Aaron Youngquist" 4 and
Professor John B. Waite'1 " agreed that a failure to comply with
the rule might well be regarded as a mere irregularity. The rule
is silent as to translation where a copy is given to a foreigner
who does not understand English."16
Waiver
The defendant may waive arraignment." 7 It has been held
there is a good waiver where the defendant and his counsel ap-
peared in court and counsel stated that he represented the de-
fendant and was informed as to the nature of the charge, and
that the defendant wished to waive formal arraignment and
plead guilty. Rule 10 does not require the defendant to plead
out of his own mouth. The defendant's failure to plead out of
his own mouth does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. The
Assistant United States Attorney had explained the charge on
inquiry by the court. The defendant admitted that he under-
stood the charge as explained by the Assistant United States
Attorney. A court of appeals has applied the well-established
rule that there is a waiver of arraignment and plea by going to
trial."8
Record
A record, reciting the defendant's arraignment in open court
112. United States v. Shepherd, 108 F. Supp. 721, 723 (D.N.HI. 1952).
113. 6 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW INSTITU'rE PROCEEDINGS 125
(1946).
114. Id. at 162.
115. Id. at 214.
116. Id. at 233.
117. Merritt v. Hunter, 170 F.2d 739, 741 (10th Cir. 1948).
118. 1caty v. United States, 203 F.2d 652, 654 (4th Cir. 1953). However, the
facts showed an arraignment and plea.
In view of the modern rule permitting waiver of arraignment it no longer
seems to be correct that "jeopardy does not attach where there is no arraignment
and plea" as asserted by a writer in Note, 24 MINN. L. REV. 522, 527 (1940).
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before trial and his plea of not guilty to the indictment, imparts
verity and cannot be contradicted by the defendant's unsup-
ported assertion that he did not know of the accusation before
trial.119 It is not a basis for reversal on appeal that arraignment
and plea do not appear in the stenographer's notes of the trial.
20
It is enough that the district judge has specifically found that
a plea of not guilty was duly entered by the defendant upon his
arraignment in open court, that such plea was entered by the
clerk on his original record and was referred to by the judge in
his charge to the jury. The court of appeals is bound by such
finding. The record shows a legal arraignment of the defendant
when it shows an arraignment, that the defendant was repre-
sented by, or had available, counsel at all times, and that the
defendant was fully aware of what was going on at all times,
and that he had had considerable experience in court pro-
cedure. 12 1 A motion to vacate sentence would not lie. Nor would
a motion to vacate lie on the unsupported assertion of the de-
fendant that the indictment was not read in open court and
that there was no opportunity to know its terms when the court
records show that the defendant was arraigned and entered a
plea of guilty.' 22
Presence of Court Reporter
At the present time under statute an official court reporter
must be present at arraignment.'2 3 But a motion to vacate sen-
tence would not lie for absence of a reporter where no court
reporter had been appointed for the court by the date of arraign-
ment in 1945 and appropriations for payment of salaries to court
reporters had not been financially enacted.'2 4
Time Relation to Trial
Following the arraignment the impaneling of the jury may
take place on the same day.1 25 The trial may commence shortly
119. Yodock v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 307, 310 (M.D. Pa. 1951). The
defendant moved to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1952).
120. Beaty v. United States, 203 F.2d 652, 653 (4th Cir. 1953).
121. Booth v. United States, 251 F.2d 296, 297 (9th Cir. 1958).
122. Caldwell v. United States, 160 F.2d 371, 372 (8th Cir. 1947).
123. Previously, reliance was placed on the clerk's minutes often incomplete
and inadequate. Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment,
20 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 1, 16-1.7 (1944).
124. United States v. Christakos, 83 F. Supp. 521, 523 (N.D. Ala. 1949). To
similareffect see United States v. Shepherd, 108 F. Supp. 721., 723 (D.N.H.
1952).
125. Picciurro v. United States, 250 F.2d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 1958).
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after impaneling of the jury. If the defendant needs more time
to prepare he should move for a continuance when the case is
called for trial.
Right to Counsel
Rule 44 lays down a requirement that the court advise the
defendant of his right to counsel at arraignment. 126 The court is
to so advise if "a defendant appears without counsel.' 1 27 He
appears in court when he is arraigned. The defendant may
waive his right to counsel at arraignment. In one federal case
it was pointed out that the State of Michigan had adopted a rule
of court expressly requiring the trial judge to advise the de-
fendant of his right to counsel at arraignment.
12
Like the earlier cases the recent cases continue to hold that
absence of counsel at arraignment when the defendant pleads
not guilty is not a basis for release on habeas corpus.12'9 There
is no constitutional requirement that the defendant be repre-
sented by counsel on arraignment where he pleads not guilty,130
Even when the defendant pleads guilty, the failure to appoint
counsel is not prejudicial where counsel is appointed immediately
thereafter and full opportunity is given to withdraw the plea,
or take whatever steps are necessary or desirable without regard
to what previously transpired. 3' But as Professor Fellman
pointed out "the better view is that one needs the advice of
counsel on the crucial question of how to plead. Some judges
have taken the position that how one pleads doesn't matter
much because counsel are always free to change a plea later.
However, once a plea of guilty has been entered, a very dam-
aging admission has been made, and counsel may be under-
standably reluctant to try to undo the harm later by changing
126. For cases where such advice was given, see United States v. Christakos,
83 F. Supp. 521, 524-27 (N.D. Ala. 1949) ; Ray v. United States, 192 F.2d 658,
659 (5th Cir. 1951) ; United States v. Von der Heide, 169 F. Supp. 560, 562
(D.D.C. 1959).
127. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 722 (1948).
128. See Von Moltke v. United States, 189 F.2d 56, 75, n. 4 (6th Cir. 1951).
129. Ruben v. Welch, 159 F.2d 493 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S.
814 (1947) ; Setser v. Welch, 159 F.2d 703, 704 (4th Cir. 1947) ; Holloway v.
Welch, 160 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1947).
130. Council v. Clemmer, 177 F.2d 22, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 880 (1949). The court stated that a contrary rule "would literally open the
doors of the penal institutions of the country." Id. at 24.
131. Council v. Clemmer, 177 F.2d 22, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 880 (1949). See also Hiatt v. Gann, 170 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1948), which
followed the same ruling for state court procedure in Canizio v. New York, 327
U.S. 82, 85 (1946).
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the plea. State courts are practically unanimous in agreeing
that the right to counsel accrues at arraignment.
13 2
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia has stated:
"It has not been the custom in this jurisdiction to assign counsel
upon arraignment if the plea is not guilty, and we are not ad-
vised that it has been the custom in other jurisdictions."'' 8
It would seem that at least in one case the Supreme Court
has laid down a stricter view with respect to the right to counsel
at arraignment. The court spoke very critically of the procedure
where on arraignment the trial judge assigned a young lawyer
for arraignment purposes only, who begrudgingly spent a few
moments with the defendant and recommended that she "stand
mute," which she did, whereupon a plea of not guilty was en-
tered and she was thereupon remanded to custody. Counsel had
never seen the indictment. Later still without counsel of her
own choice and without counsel having been assigned to her as
the trial judge had promised, she changed her plea to guilty.
Justice Black stated: "Arraignment is too important a step in
a criminal proceeding to give such wholly inadequate represen-
tation to one charged with a crime," and there should be no
"hollow compliance with the mandate of the Constitution at a
stage so important as arraignment.' 3 4 Such an appointment is
not a waiver of counsel. Possibly the case can be reconciled
with the views of the lower federal courts on the basis that the
defendant was not promptly supplied with counsel following the
arraignment, so that she made her subsequent guilty plea with-
out representation by counsel.135 Counsel was only appointed at
a time when it was too late to move to withdraw the plea of
guilty under the old Rule 11 (4) of the Criminal Appeals Rules.
Under the present Rule 32(d) of the Federal Criminal Rules
the defendant has more ample time to withdraw his plea.
132. FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS 123 (1958).
133. Council v. Clemmer, 177 F.2d 22, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied 338
U.S. 880 (1947).
134. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723 (1948). See Balter, Assignment
of Counsel in Federal Courts to Defend Indigent Persons Accused of Crimes, 24
CAT, . B.J. 114, 117 (1949); Note, 22 Tzmp. L.Q. 140, 141 (1948). On the
other hand the importance of arraignment is discounted in PuTTKAMER, AD-
MINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 165 (1953).
135. Three dissenting members of the court pointed out that the procedure at
arraignment was not prejudicial as a plea of not guilty was entered when the de-
fendant stood mute. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 731 (1948).
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IV. MODERN REFORM PROPOSALS
England
In England an indicted defendant must personally appear at
the bar of the court in order to be arraigned, that is to say, called
to a reckoning by hearing the indictment read, and to plead to
it.136 If the trial is in the Queen's Bench Division and for mis-
demeanor, the defendant may, by leave of court, appear by at-
torney. Under the Indictments Act of 1915 it is the duty of the
clerk of court to supply to the defendant, on request, a copy of
the indictment free of charge.
A.L.I. Code of Criminal Procedure
Under Section 201 of the American Law Institute Code of
Criminal Procedure 7 the defendant may demand before plead-
ing that the indictment or information be read to him. The
Federal Rule gives the defendant no such right. The Code pro-
vides that the clerk state the charge or read the accusation. The
Federal Rule is silent on who shall state or read the charge.
Under Section 206 of the Code there is in effect a waiver of
arraignment when the defendant pleads to the accusation or
proceeds to trial without objection. Section 287 requires pres-
ence of the defendant in felony cases, and Section 288 in mis-
demeanor cases. Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure does not require presence in misdemeanor cases, although
the defendant has a right to be present if he wishes. Section 203
of the Institute Code provides that before the defendant is ar-
raigned on a felony charge "if he is without counsel the court
shall, unless the defendant objects, assign him counsel to repre-
sent him in the cause." Rule 44 of the Federal Rules does not
specifically refer to arraignment, but impliedly does so. Section
193 of the Institute Code provides for the furnishing of a copy
of the accusation, whether requested or not, at least twenty-four
hours before the defendant is required to plead. But a failure
to furnish the copy is not prejudicial error if the defendant
pleads to the accusation.
Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure
Arraignment is dealt with in Rule 23 of the Uniform Rules
136. KENNY, OUTLINE OF CRIMINAL LAW 560, § 735 (17th ed. by Turner,
1958).
137. For analysis of the American Law Institute Code, see ORFIELD, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 273-77 (1947).
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of Criminal Procedure adopted in 1952. Rule 23(a) provides:
"Arraignment shall be conducted in open court and, unless
waived by the defendant, shall consist of reading the indict-
ment or information to the defendant or, if the defendant so
requests, stating to him, the substance of the charge, and calling
on him to plead thereto. The defendant shall be given a copy of
the indictment or information at least [ ] days before he is
called upon to plead. Defendants who are jointly charged may
be arraigned separately or together in the discretion of the
court." Rule 23(b) provides for assignment of counsel. Rule
23(c) provides that the record shall show compliance. With
respect to prison offenses "the inquiries and remarks of the
court and the responses thereto, if any, of the defendant, made
to determine whether the defendant understands his right to be
represented by counsel, the nature of the offense with which he
is charged, and the punishment which may be imposed, shall
be taken and transcribed and shall become a part of the record."
The drafters were impressed by the criticism of the Fed-
eral Rule, which does not require a reading, that there would
be difficulties in determining whether there had been compliance
with the rule. 8 8 The defendant might contend that the substance
of the accusation had not been actually stated. In many states
statutes require reading. 139 But since under the Federal Rules
a copy of the accusation is given the defendant even without
request it seems unrealistic to require a reading.
138. Berge, The Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 42 MICH. L.
REV. 353, 363 (1943).
139. A.L.I. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 624-26, commentaries (1931).
1959]
